Material Considerations, 14 November 2026
The railway we inherited, the infrastructure we owe
Brendan Buck | BPS Planning
Why does building Ireland’s future take so long and cost so much? Research points beyond the familiar argument about planning permission to a harder question: how well have we organised ourselves to build?
My children travel every day to school and university in Bray and Dublin on the south-eastern railway. Their education belongs to the twenty-first century. The broad geography of their journey was settled in the nineteenth.
For the older two, commuting to college is not a preference over living nearby. The accommodation we have encountered has been unavailable, unsuitable or beyond an affordable price. Nor can my children simply switch to a car. A shortage of decent student accommodation thus becomes another demand on the railway. Decisions discussed in separate policy documents arrive together in the same morning journey.
There is something both reassuring and disquieting about that inheritance. A railway survives the people who conceived it, the companies that financed it and the political order under which it was built. Generations make their lives along it. Yet its endurance can conceal a failure to provide adequately for those who come afterwards.
The history needs care. This was not one railway laid in a single burst of Parnellite confidence. The first Dublin–Kingstown line opened in 1834, before Parnell was born. Bray followed in 1854, Wicklow in 1855 and Wexford in 1872. The southern railway and harbour arrangements developed further into the next century. Nor is the whole route single track. Dublin to Bray is double track; south of Bray the route is predominantly single track, with passing places, as Iarnród Éireann’s network map shows.
None of this makes the line obsolete. Old railways can carry modern services. But a single-track section imposes a continuing discipline: trains travelling in opposite directions must be kept apart, and the timetable must accommodate the places where they can pass. The past is not merely visible through the window. It helps determine what can run outside it.
It is tempting to turn that observation into an accusation. How could a poorer country build a railway when a richer one struggles to enlarge it? The question deserves an answer, but not the easy answer that earlier generations possessed resolve and we possess only procedures.
That is the purpose of Material Considerations: to bring the research and academic underpinnings of planning into a discussion too often conducted through accusation and anecdote. The literature does not offer Ireland a single culprit. It offers something more useful: ways of distinguishing problems that require quite different remedies.
Before the first excavation
First, we need to know which clock we are reading.
A project can spend years between a political announcement and a planning application. During that interval, its sponsor may be comparing routes, investigating ground conditions, revising demand forecasts, assembling a business case or waiting for funding. The statutory decision then has its own timetable. Land acquisition, procurement, detailed design, construction, testing and commissioning introduce others. Some overlap. Others depend on what has gone before.
To call the entire interval a planning delay is to replace an explanation with a label. Equally, to insist that planning decisions are only one stage does not excuse avoidable delay at that stage. An applicant, a community and a public authority all have an interest in a competent decision within a credible period.
The Government’s Accelerating Infrastructure Report and Action Plan, published in December 2025, records Uisce Éireann’s assessment of seven to ten years to develop a small wastewater-treatment project and ESB Networks’ assessment of five to six years for a typical basic substation. These are reported development lifecycles, not years spent awaiting one planning decision. They are not, by themselves, a controlled comparison with other countries. They nevertheless direct attention towards ordinary enabling infrastructure, without which more conspicuous national ambitions cannot proceed.
Irish research offers a particularly revealing account of how time accumulates. In a 2024 study of electricity infrastructure, Genaro Longoria, Muireann Lynch, Niall Farrell and John Curtis examined the organisation of planning and regulatory approvals. Their mechanism is simple: a project moving through sequential processes may miss the next application window because an earlier decision arrived late. A modest delay can then produce a much longer wait.
Their accessible research bulletin makes an important distinction. The study concerns how scrutiny is organised, rather than what environmental scrutiny should require. Its modelled scenarios produced wholesale electricity prices up to 10 per cent higher, as delayed renewable generation changed the operation of the electricity system. That is a scenario result, not a measured surcharge on every Irish bill. The authors also noted subsequent reforms to application arrangements. We should not describe the rules they modelled as if nothing had changed.
The enduring lesson is that time can be lost between institutions as well as within them. Better coordination and appropriately parallel applications can improve delivery without deciding that a river, a landscape or a neighbour should count for less.
The price of a promise
We also need to distinguish a high cost from a cost overrun.
A difficult project may be expensive and accurately estimated. Another may appear inexpensive because an early estimate omits work that later proves unavoidable. A third may become unaffordable because the public budget changes. These are different failures, if failures they are at all.
A comparison between a nineteenth-century railway and a modern upgrade cannot settle the matter. The purchasing power of money, the works included, the land required and the standards expected have all changed. Upgrading an operating line also means maintaining a service while altering the system on which it depends. Accessibility, safety and environmental protection are part of what we now ask infrastructure to deliver, not merely costs attached to its real purpose.
There are genuine physical constraints. Iarnród Éireann’s DART+ Coastal South explanation identifies single track, the coast and tunnels as limits on additional services south of Bray. Its proposed first-stage interventions are intended to enable an increase from two to three trains an hour in each direction between Bray and Greystones. These are proposals and capacity objectives, not a promise here about a completion date or a future timetable. They demonstrate why drawing a second line on a map is not the same exercise as building a second railway.
Yet difficult engineering cannot explain every disappointing estimate. Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm and Søren Buhl’s landmark 2002 study found systematic cost underestimation across 258 transport projects. Their explanation placed particular weight on strategic misrepresentation: incentives to make projects look more attractive when approval was being sought. Their estimates were compared in constant prices. Inflation alone could not explain the pattern.
This is an uncomfortable argument because it asks whether some projects win support through the very estimates that make their eventual delivery appear scandalous. The correction of an inadequate early budget can look like the sudden creation of a new cost. In fact, part of the obligation may have been there all along.
It would be irresponsible to convert that international finding into an allegation that a particular Irish sponsor has deceived anyone. It would be equally irresponsible to ignore the institutional question. Who benefits from a low initial number? Who can challenge it? Does admitting uncertainty make a proposal less likely to survive the competition for funding?
There is disagreement within the literature about where explanation should begin. In Academics and Auditors, the geographer and planning scholar Matti Siemiatycki found considerable agreement that transport projects experienced escalating costs, but sharply different emphases. Government auditors tended to foreground technical and managerial problems; academic studies more often emphasised political, economic and psychological explanations. Those perspectives lead towards different remedies.
Ireland needs both kinds of attention. Incentives matter, but so do incomplete designs and weak management. Independent challenge to a business case cannot replace competent delivery; competent delivery cannot redeem a business case selected on misleading assumptions.
The practical implication is to publish the history of an estimate, not merely its latest total. Readers should be able to distinguish inflation, altered scope, new information and delivery failure, and to see whether two apparently comparable figures include the same things. Early estimates should acknowledge their uncertainty. Experience from comparable completed projects should discipline confidence about the next one.
A country is not a collection of applications
Here Irish geography makes a contribution that the usual argument about red tape misses.
In their study of Dublin’s metropolitan governance, Niamh Moore-Cherry and John Tomaney described a city in which national governmental power was concentrated, while the metropolitan area itself remained comparatively weak. They called the reluctance to empower that scale of government “metro-phobia”. Their concern was not simply the duration of individual decisions. It was the mismatch between a functioning urban region and the institutions governing its development.
Their 2019 paper is not a measurement of today’s infrastructure delays. It is a diagnosis of why land use, services and investment can fail to form a coherent whole. Plans can recognise interdependence without giving anyone sufficient authority or resources to manage it.
A household travelling between Wicklow and Dublin experiences a connected region. Administrative responsibilities divide it differently. Housing, education, transport, water and electricity may each be planned through legitimate but separate processes. The challenge is not to abolish their distinct responsibilities. It is to establish who must reconcile their programmes, and who answers when the connections fail.
Building more homes near railway stations is a sound principle, not a mistake to be corrected. But proximity to a line is not the same as access to a useful service. If homes and other development add passengers without corresponding improvements in service and capacity, crowding can undermine the alternative to driving. Some who can afford a car may turn to it; those who cannot are left with fewer choices. My family’s experience is not a measurement of that effect across this route. It is a reason to ask who bears the consequences when investment falls behind development.
This is not a newly discovered concern. Simon McDonnell and Brian Caulfield’s 2011 study, using Dublin’s 2006 census data, described the mismatch between sustainable-transport ambitions and the location of new housing. It was a descriptive study of an earlier housing boom, not an explanation of today’s train crowding. Its warning remains relevant: development patterns can work against the transport outcomes policy says it wants.
Karen Lucas’s work on transport and social exclusion brings the distributional question into focus. The purpose is access to education, work and services, not movement for its own sake. For a student unable to find decent accommodation near college, a reliable railway is part of the practical opportunity to attend. Capacity decisions should account for people who have no convenient alternative, not only those whom a better service might persuade to leave a car at home.
This argument gives planners a responsibility beyond processing applications. It also challenges the profession. A beautifully expressed development objective is not a delivery programme. If a plan depends on infrastructure, its preparation should expose the dependencies, identify the responsible bodies and distinguish funded commitments from aspirations.
Research on Irish procurement supplies another corrective to the idea that permission is the whole story. Eoin Reeves, Donal Palcic and Darragh Flannery’s study of 59 Irish public–private partnership projects found an average tendering period of 34 months. This was a historical sample, not a current average for all public works. Importantly, tendering periods fell over time. The evidence contains learning as well as difficulty.
The study matters because procurement has its own institutional demands. A permission does not determine a contract, create an effective client organisation or guarantee competition. Nor does changing the source of finance automatically solve the problem of allocating responsibility for uncertainty.
The Government’s 2025 infrastructure report similarly identifies procurement difficulties, uncertain project pipelines and construction capacity among the barriers to delivery. A contractor cannot invest indefinitely in specialist people and equipment on the strength of projects that repeatedly change their timing. A public body cannot be an effective purchaser if its own expertise is too thin to understand what it is buying.
There is a market consequence, too. Ireland cannot assume unlimited specialist capacity will appear for every programme simultaneously. Where capacity is scarce, more money can mean higher bids rather than proportionately more output. Transferring an uncertain risk to a contractor does not make that risk disappear: it may return as a price, a qualification, a dispute or an unwillingness to tender. This is a reason for informed allocation of risk, not a presumption against private delivery.
The policy task is therefore steadier than an annual bidding contest between urgent causes. It requires a credible sequence of work, investment in public-client capability and a willingness to preserve useful expertise between projects. Faster permission and a more reliable investment programme should be complements, not rival explanations.
Consent is not an inconvenience
None of this means the planning system should be defended in every particular. Duplication, avoidable uncertainty and poorly explained decisions impose real costs. Environmental requirements should be applied competently and proportionately. An unnecessary repetition of work protects nobody merely because it takes time.
But the opposite simplification is dangerous: that everyone between a proposal and a construction site is an obstacle.
In research on a proposed offshore wind farm in Northern Ireland, Geraint Ellis, John Barry and Clive Robinson examined different discourses of support and objection. Their work treats public acceptance as a matter of values and interpretation, rather than something adequately explained by a technical description of the project. The implications extend beyond wind energy, although one case cannot establish how much time any particular consultation will save.
For practice, the lesson is to understand disagreement before announcing that it has been overcome. People may support an energy transition and dispute a location. They may recognise a public benefit while bearing a disproportionate local burden. A landowner’s concern about access or the future use of a holding is not answered by repeating the national case for the scheme.
Early engagement should allow relevant knowledge to alter a proposal while alternatives remain meaningful. That is not a guarantee of agreement. Some conflicts require a decision that leaves people dissatisfied. The obligation is to make that decision lawfully and explain it honestly, not to pretend that consultation has manufactured consent.
The EU Environmental Impact Assessment Directive provides for early and effective participation while options remain open, and access to review of substantive or procedural legality. It also expressly provides for coordinated assessment procedures where appropriate. The law itself recognises that effective safeguards and better organisation are not opposites.
Legal challenges can delay projects. That does not establish that all challenged projects were sound, that every challenge was justified, or that litigation explains most of the elapsed time across infrastructure delivery. Those are empirical questions requiring a project history, not a count of court cases alone.
There is, nevertheless, an environmental cost to delay as well as to construction. The electricity research illustrates it: postponing cleaner generation can leave a system using more polluting alternatives. Good planning must examine the consequences of proceeding, refusing and postponing, without treating any one of those choices as automatically benign.
What, then, can planners and geographers do?
They can begin where their expertise is strongest: explaining how places and systems depend on one another. They can connect settlement decisions to service capacity, including the relationship between college locations, affordable student accommodation and daily travel; identify corridors and environmental constraints before designs harden; and make the distribution of benefits and burdens visible. They can distinguish an objection that reveals a design problem from a disagreement that cannot be designed away.
They can also help make delivery intelligible. A project record should show the passage from options to decision, funding to procurement, construction to operation, including pauses and their reasons. Without that evidence, the same institution can be blamed for years it did not control, while a genuine failure elsewhere remains unexamined. Universities and delivery bodies could make much more of shared, independently scrutinised research on completed projects, including those that went well.
These are conclusions drawn from the literature, not promises that professional skill can overcome every constraint. Planners do not control national budgets. Geographers do not award construction contracts. Neither profession can supply political choices that elected government has declined to make. Their contribution is to make those choices better informed and their consequences harder to evade.
I return to the railway because it makes the obligation unusually clear. We need not imagine the nineteenth century as an age without delay: the history of the works around Bray Head records stoppages, difficult construction and deaths among those who built it. Nor need we accept inherited capacity as an adequate settlement for another generation.
The proper tribute to an old railway is not to ask why we cannot become Victorian again. It is to provide the knowledge, institutions and sustained commitment through which a modern democracy can improve what it has inherited.
My children’s journeys are one small part of that obligation. The people who built the line could not have known them. We owe something of the same care to passengers we will never meet.
Further reading
- Simon McDonnell and Brian Caulfield (2011), Measuring the Failure of Planning and Its Impact on Sustainable Travel in Dublin, Ireland. Open full text.
- Karen Lucas (2012), Transport and social exclusion: Where are we now?. University abstract and publication details.
- Niamh Moore-Cherry and John Tomaney (2019), Spatial planning, metropolitan governance and territorial politics in Europe: Dublin as a case of metro-phobia?. Open accepted manuscript.
- Genaro Longoria, Muireann Lynch, Niall Farrell and John Curtis (2024), The impact of extended decision times in planning and regulatory processes for energy infrastructure. See also the authors’ research bulletin.
- Eoin Reeves, Donal Palcic and Darragh Flannery (2015), PPP Procurement in Ireland: An Analysis of Tendering Periods. University abstract and publication details.
- Geraint Ellis, John Barry and Clive Robinson (2007), Many ways to say ‘no’, different ways to say ‘yes’. University abstract and publication details.
- Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm and Søren Buhl (2002), Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?. Open manuscript.
- Matti Siemiatycki (2009), Academics and Auditors: Comparing Perspectives on Transportation Project Cost Overruns. Publisher’s abstract.
This is a literature-based opinion essay, not an original empirical study. Sources were checked on 7 November 2026; the operator’s DART+ capacity information and source links were rechecked on 14 November 2026. Some journal arguments are drawn from accessible abstracts and the authors’ summaries rather than full-text readings. BPS Planning: editorial discussion only, not legal advice.
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